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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
DOHRMAN HOTEL SUPPLY CO., 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BEAU BRUM:3IEL, INc. 
a Corporation, 
- Defendant and Appellant . 
. -\ ppP.a} From tne Third District Court of Utah1 
for Salt Lake County 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE~IENT OF THE CAS:lli 
In the month of October, 1934, Mr. George 
Glaus and Rlosa Glaus, his wife, as, officers and 
principal owners of the defendant corporation, and 
th~ corporation were preparing to open a new cafe 
in Salt Lake City, under the name of Beau Brummel 
Cafe, and were in the market for a complete set-up 
Qf restaurant equipment. During 10ctober, 1934, 
Mr George Glaus. the president and manager of 
the defendant, Beau Brummel, Ine., went to Los 
A ng-C'les, California, for the purpose of buying 
rE':-;taurant equipment for the defendant company. 
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2 
lie had been in the restaurant business for some 
25 or 30 years. He went to plaintiff's place of 
husiness and picked out a considerable amount of 
1nerchandise handled by the plaintiff company a~ 
the Los Angeles store. Mr. Glaus then made a 
special trip from Los Angeles up to San Francisco 
to see a piece of equipment known and designated 
as a thern1otainer, which the plaintiff company had 
in its San Francisco store. After Mr. Glaus saw 
:and examined the thermotainer, he decided to pur-
chase the same for defendant, and went hack to 
Los Angeles and entered into a conditional sales 
contract on behalf of the defendant company for 
the purchase from the plaintiff of all of said mer·· 
t•handise, including the thermotainer, which he had 
inspected and selected at San Francisco. The con-
tract. a~ entered into at the home office of the plain-
tiff company, at Los Angeles, specifically stated 
that, although the price was set out at $2898.41, it 
might fluctuate either above or below that amount, 
depending upon the items actually delivered. The 
defendant agreed to pay for the items. actually de-
livered, and the plaintiff, under the terms of said 
'-~ontract, retained title to all of said merchandise 
as actually delivered, until paid in full. 
At the trial it was stipulated that the total 
purchase price of the merchandise actually de-
livered under the contract was $2492.17. Upon thi::; 
amount, the defendant made payments and received 
credits totalling 'in the aggregate $1,966.33, leaving 
a halance due at the time suit was filed herein of 
approximately $525.84, plus some interest, as the 
contract called for interest at the rate of eight per-
cent per annum from_ the due dates of the mrious 
installmer1ts. This balance not having been paid 
by the defendant, the plaintiff, in .June of 193m filed 
an action in replevin in the City Court of Salt J.;ake 
City, asking for the possession of said merchan-
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dise, and in the event the possession could not be 
had, a judgment for the value thereof. In the 
,original con1plaint, as filed in the City Court, the 
value \\~a~ stated as $555.08. At the time of the 
trial in the City Court, an mnendment was made to 
conform to the proof adduced in the City Court, 
by which amendment, the value of the property was 
stated to be approxin1ately $900.00. At the trial in 
the City Court, the defendant by its answer raised, 
in addition to general denials, merely a question as 
to whether there had been a settlement entered into 
tetween plaintiff and defendant. After judgment 
for plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the District 
Court, and then filed an amended answer wherein 
it set up, in addition to the deffense of settlement, 
a defense of breach of warranty. The defendant 
claims that at the time the thermotainer was sold 
to it, there \\~as not only an express warranty given 
by the plaintiff company, but also that implied 
warranties would be raised by virtue of the cir-
eumstances surrounding the transaction. Defend-
ant then claims that there has been a breach of this 
implied warranty, and seeks a deduction from the 
purcha:::e price by way of recoupment !or the 
claimed b:reach of warranty. 
\Vhen :Jfr. Glaus inspected the thermotainer at San 
Francisco, he was. there told that it originally cost 
$1500.00, and that it had been sold and had been 
out in the possession of some concern that ha6 
gone broke and the plaintiff company, because of 
thP insolvency of the original buyer, had been com-
pelled to take it back, and that although the original 
cost was $1500.00, the plaintiff would sell it to the 
defendant for $500.00. Glaus, as m·anllg'er of the 
r1Pfrndant, accepted it on this basis and the contract 
-,nli' executed according-ly. 
The thermotainer was delivered to the defend-
ant some time in October of 1934, and invoiced to 
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defendant under date of October 19. (See Exhibit 
A). 
The defendant company kept and used the 
'thermotainer in his place of business until April 
or May, 1935, and no complaint of any kind was 
ever made to the plaintiff company at Los Angeles 
until after the thermotainer had been taken out of 
use, at which time the defendant wrote to the Los 
Angeles office as follows: 
''I have had to take the thermotainer out 
of service. It is not adaptable to my pur-
pose. Advise me if there is- any disposi-
tion you can make of same." (Exhibit F). 
The defendant had made some complaint during 
March, 1935, to one Don Nelson, who was traveling 
~alesman for the plaintiff company. 
Long after the thermotainer was taken out of 
service and wholly without any authority or direc-
tion from the plaintiff, the defendant expressed the 
thermotainer back to the plaintiff at Los Angeles, 
and some time thereafter requested the plaintiff 
to credit it with $375.00. The plaintiff refused to 
accept the return of the thermotainer and allow 
defendant any credit therefor. By letter dated 
January 9, 1936, the defendant mailed to plaintiff 
a check for $152.44, stating in said letter: 
'''We are enclosing• our- check for $152.44, 
which is the amount our books show after 
deducting $375.00, without interest credits 
to your account. '' 
Some time after the return of the thermotainer, 
the defendant company claimed to have been 
authorized to return the thermotainer for credit by 
Don Nelson, the traveling salesman for plaintiff. 
No direct authority from plaintiff was ever claim-
ed, and no comn1nnication with plaintiff with re-
E:pect to the return of the thermotainer for credit 
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or otherwise was had until after it had been ex-
pressed back to plaintiff at Los Angeles. 
The plaintiff, upon receipt of the thermotainer, 
notified the defendant that it would hold said ther-
motainer subject to defendant's order, and has 
continued to hold the s.ame on defendant's account 
and subject to defendant's order since it was re-
turned. :rhe plaintiff refused to accept the check 
of $152.44, and returned it to the defendant, wliere-
upon the defendant forwarded it to plaintiff's 
attorne-y, and the same has been in the hands of 
plaintiff's attorney until tendered in court at the 
time of the trial herein, the plaintiff at all times 
having refused to accept either the return of the 
thermotainer or the tender of the $152.44. 
No question has been raised with respect to 
any part of the contract or any piece of equipment, 
except this one item, which is known and desig-
nated as the thermotainer. 
THE APPEAL PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING 
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION 
1. 
Whether or not there was any express warranty 
made by plaintiff upon the sale of this piece of 
equipment called the thermotainer. 
~. 
Whether there could be any warranty implied 
in the sale of the thermotainer to defendant. 
:t 
·Whether or not there has been any breach of 
warranty, either express or implied. 
-t-. 
Whether there wa.s any settlement agreement 
with any authorized agent of the plaintiff company, 
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acting within either the real or apparent scope of 
the agency so as to make any such settlement bind-
ing upon the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENSE OF WARRANTY · 
ExPREss ·wARRANTY 
The evidence conclusively shows that there was 
no express warranty made in connection with the 
sale of the equipment involved herein. The evi~ 
dence relied on by the defendant, and the only evi~ 
dence produced in this connection was the testi-
nwny of 1tfr. Glaus with respect to statements made 
by the plaintiff's salesman at San Francisco, con-
(·erning which Mr. Glaus said: 
"He showed me the equipment and he 
says 'orie of the finest pieces of equipment 
of all'." (Tr. 153). 
Again-
"He says he guaranteed that piece of 
equipment as one of the best of all." (Tr. 
154). 
This evidence is the only evidence anywhere in the 
testimony with respect to any ·express warranty. 
Merely that the salesman said he would guarantee 
it as one of the finest pieces of equipment. 
In the case of 
Detroit V. S. Company v. ·W eiter L. Co., 
61 Utah 503, 
th~ s Court had occasion to discuss language similar 
to that claimed by defendant in this case in con-
nection with a claimed warranty, and held that such 
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statements did not constitute warranty .enforceable 
either as a defense or as an independent cause of 
action, but was merely dealers' talk. 
See also the following cases: 
Alexander v. Stone, 156 Pac. 998, (Cal.) 
W. J. Bush & Co. v. Van Camp Sea Food 
Co., 203 Pac. 1026, (Cal.) 
Parker v. Hutchinson Motor Car Co., 274 
Pac. 1115 ( Kan.) 
In connection with this claim of express war-
ranty, we would like to refer the Court to other 
evidence. It is undisputed that Mr. Glaus, the pres-
ident and manager of the defendant company, was 
purchasing this equipment for the defendant com-
pany. He evidently knew something about res,taur-
ant equipment) because he had been in that busi-
ness for 25 to 30 years, and had gone to Los An-
geles to buy miscellaneous equipment prior to his 
opening of the Beau Brummel Cafe, and upon learn-
ing that the plaintiff company had this thermo-
tainer at San Francisco, he made a special trip to 
San Francisco to inspect it, and it was while there 
that he claims these statements upon which he 're-
lies for an express warranty, were made. 
Subsequent to his going to San Francisco to in-
spect this equipment, he went back to Los Angeles. 
and it was on this return trip to Los AngJeles when 
he signed with the plaintiff the conditional ~ales 
contract, Exhibit A. There is no express warranty 
contained in the contract, Exhibit A, and all-prior 
negotiations are presumed to have been merged 
in the written contract. Tha.t, in and of itself, 
would defeat plaintiff's claim to an express war-
ranty, and we think is such a well recognized rule 
that it needs no citation of authority here. We 
will, howPver, call the Court's attention to the 
ease of 
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Landes & Co. v. ],allows, reported in 81 
Utah 432, at page 437; 19 Pac. (2d) 
389. 
IMPLIED WARRANTY 
On page 15 of appellant's brief, there is 
quoted the provisions of Sub-Section 1 of Section 
15, Chapter 1 of rritle 81, Revised Statutes of Utah 
1933, and, in reliance upon that authority, defend-
ant ~.nd appellant claims that there should be a 
-.varranty implied from the circumstances sur-
rounding the sale of this thermotainer. In that 
connection, however, we think it sigmificant to note 
that the defendant has not pointed out in the brief 
just where or in what part of the testimony it wa~ 
''expressly or by implication made known'' to the 
seller the purpose for which the buyer wanted this 
thermotainer. Nor is there anytthing either in tlw 
evidence or in the argument of counsel for the de-
fendant showing ''that the buyer relied on the 
seller's skill or judgment.' :· ':rhe whole of the tes-
timony of l\1r. Glaus and it is the only testimony 
bearing upon the subject, because he is the one 
who talked with plaintiff's representative in San 
Francisco, was that plaintiff's salesman ''showed 
me the equipment 'and he says one of the finest 
pieces of equipment of all'." There is not one word 
of evidence which shows or tends to show that Mr. 
Glaus made any statement to the plaintiff company 
or any of its agents as to the particular purpose for 
.which he wanted this piece of equipment. Th~re 
is not one word of testimony to indicate that Mr. 
Glaus or anyone else connected with the defendant 
company placed any reliance in the seller's state-
ments or that he ~relied on the seller's skJil(l. or 
judgment. On the contrary, Mr. Glaus made a 
special trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco in 
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order to personally inspect this item of equip-
rnent. The equipment was purchas.ed under a 
specific name - a trade-name, and designated in 
the contract to purchase as a thern1otainer. The 
specific thermotainer that Mr. Glaus went to San 
Francisco to inspect was sold to him and he bought 
it after inspection. That specific thermotainer 
was charged to hin1 pursuant to tlie contract, and 
where such a specific article is purchased and de-· 
livered after inspection by the proposed buyer, 
there is no warranty implied as to the fitness for 
any purpose, whether made known or not. To this 
effect, see the case of 
Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 19 
Pac. ( 2'd) 389. 
For all that appears from the evidence, the 
defendant; and :Mr. Glaus as representing the de-
fendant as a buyer of this equipment, relied on his 
uwn judgment, based upon over 25 years' exper-
ience, rather than upon the judgment of the seller 
and bought an article known by a specific name in 
the trade, after he had made an inspection of the 
same. 
In the case of 
Oil ·Well Supply Company v. Hopper, 282 
Pac. 701, 
.the defendant had bought from the plaintiff seam-
less pipe casing for an· oil well. The plaintiff 
sued for a balance due, and the defendant counter-
claimed for damages because of defect in the pipe. 
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the de-
fendant's defense and counter-claim and directed 
a verdict for the plaintiff upon the ground that 
there was no implied warranty that the pipe was 
J'it for thE' particular purpose for which it was 
used. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in affirm--
ing the trial court, quoted with approval from a 
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United States Supreme Court case, and earlier 
Kansas cas.es to the effect that 
"a contract for the sale of a known, de-
scribed and defined article manufactured 
generally for the trade, in which no war-
ranty is expressed, does not give rise to 
an implied warranty of fitness. for the 
purpose intended by the buyer, although 
the seller knew the buyer was purchasing 
it to accomplish that purpose." 
J\1:ine Supply Company v. Columbia Min-
ing Company, 86 Pac. 789 (Ore.) : 
''Where one contracts or agrees to supply 
an article to be applied or used for a par-
ticular purpose, and the buyer has no 
opportunity of inspection, but relies upon 
the judgment and skill of the seller, and 
not his own, there is an implied warranty 
that the article shall be reasonably fit and 
suitable for the purpose intended . . . 
but where, as in this case, a known and 
described article is ordered, there is no 
implied warranty of its fitness, if it is 
actually furnished, although the seller 
was advised that it was. intended for a 
special purpose. If the purchaser gets, the 
article he buys, and buys that which he 
gets, he takes the risk of its suitableness 
for the intended purpose, unless there is 
an express warranty.'' 
In addition to the foregoing cas~es, we cite the 
following: 
Ehrsom v. Brown, 91 Bac. 179 (Kan.). 
Young v. Plattner Implement Co., 91 P.ac. 
1109 (Colo.). 
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Peninsula Motor Co v. Daggett, 218 Pac. 
253 (Wash.) 
Illinois Zinc Co. v. Semple, 255 Pa.c. 78 
(Kan.) 
Stoehrer & P. Dodgem Corp. v. Greenburg, 
146 N .E. 34 (:Mass.) 
Peoria Grape Sugar Co. v. Turney, 51 
N.E. 587 (Ill.) 
Peoples Light Company v. Rathbun-J ones 
Engineering Co., 218 Federal 167. 
Flaherty v. Main ill otor Carriage Co., 104 
Atl. 627 (Me.) 
In this connection we also direct the Court's 
attention to the case of 
Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah 38; 206 Pac. 
553, 
wherein this Court held that upon t_he sale of 
goods, where the goods were examined by the 
buyer before buying, the rule of cave·at emptor 
applies and no warranty is implied. 
There is another very important reason why 
there should not be any warranty implied with re-
spect to the piece of equipment called the thermo-
tainer involved in this action. This piece of equip-
ment originally cost $1500.00, and the. plaintiff 
company sold it to the defendant for $500.00 (Tr. 
154). Mr. Glaus made a special trip to San Fran-
cisco to examine this thermotainer. That was his 
only purpose in making the trip (Tr. 218). He 
saw it at San Francisco and looked it over before 
lw bought it, -was told at that time that it was 
n secondhand piece of equipment, and bought it 
as ·such, knowing that it was secondhand. (Tr. 
231-:?32). T t ·was of such a nature in its second-
hand condition that while it originally sold for 
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$1500.00, the plaintiff was selling it to the defend-
ant for $500.00, one-third of the original cost. 
It is a general rule, which prevails in most 
jurisdictions that there is no implied warranty 
as to the condition, adaptability, fitness, or suit-
ability for the purpose for which made, or the qual-
ity of an article sold as and for a secondhand 
article. 
In the case of 
Tibbetts & Pleasant Inc. v. Town of Fair-
fax, 292· Pac. 9 (Okla.), 
the plaintiff brought suit for the purchase price 
of certain machinery. The defendant claimed 
damages for breach of implied warranty. The lower 
court gave judgment for the plaintiff and on appeal 
the defendant contended that 
"since it was proved without dispute that 
plaintiff was informed as to the purpose 
for which the property was to he used by 
the defendant, there was. an implied war-
ranty of its fitness for such purpose, and 
as the evidence showed that the machine 
was worthless, the trial court erred in 
rend '"'ring judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff; and in refusing to enter judgment in 
favor of the defendant." 
The machine was a secondhand machine. The de-
. fendant knew this and inspected the machine be-
fore purchasing it. The Supreme Court of Okla-
homa, in affirming the trial court, held that 
''the principal of an implied warranty, an 
exception to the general rule of caveat 
emptor, does not apply to the purchase of 
8econdhand machinery.'' 
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ln a similar case 
Lamb v. Otto, 197 Pac. 147, 
from the State of California, involving the sale of 
a secondhand automobile, the California appellate 
court held that there was no implied warranty, and 
that inasmuch as there was a written contract with 
no ambiguity in it, the buyer could not give any 
evidence of any claimed express warranties as to 
the quality or character of the automobile, other 
than as stated in the contract. 
For similar holdings, see the following cases: 
Colchord Machinery Company v. Loy Wil-
son Foundry & Machinery Co., 110 
S. W. 630 (Mo.) 
Old City Iron Works v. Belmont, 7 S. W. 
(2d) 772, (Ark.) 
Moore v. Switzer, 239 Pac. 87 4 (Colo.) 
Hysko v. Morawski, 202 N. W. 923. 
Perine Machinery Co., v. Buck, 156 Pac. 
20 (Wash.) 
McDonald v. Dorfman, 32 S. W. ( 2d) 443. 
Jones v. Armstrong, 145 Pac. 949 (Mont.) 
Johnson v. Carden, 65 So. 813 (Ala.) 
Yellowjacket Mining Co. v. Tegarden, 149 
S.W. 518 (Ark.) 
J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Bailey, 
11.5 S. W. 949 (Ark.) 
Ramming v. Caldwell, 43 Ill. A~p. 175. 
Norris v. Reinstedler, 90 Mo. App. 626. 
Hanna Breckenridge Co. v. Holley Mat-
thews Mfg. Co., 146 S. W. 923 (Mo.) 
Joy v. National Exchange Bank, 7 4 S. ·W. 
325 (Tex.) 
Kernan v. Crook, 59 Atl. 753 (Md.) 
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Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Palace Drug 
Store, 245 S.W. 1032 (Tex.) 
In "onnection .with this question of implied 
'warranty, we wish to refer to the cases cited by 
appellant. 
In the cas.e of Starr Piano Co. v. Martin, 7 
Pac. (2d) 383) cited on page 15 of appellant's 
:brief, there was a contract whieh, by its very terms, 
:stated that the seller was selling to the buyer the 
''following equipment designed for use in connec-
tion with Simplex Projecting Machines.'' By the 
very terms of the contract, the seller contracted 
that the machines were to be used and would work 
with the Simplex Projecting machines. They fail-
ed to work with the projecting machines, and 
clearly there was a breach of warranty. 
In the case of Chicago Steel Foundry Com-
pany v. Crowell Company, 14 Pac. (2d) 1105, cited 
on page 16 of appellant's brief, the evidence in the 
case was not given in the opinion, but the syllabus, 
written by the Court, informs us sufficiently to 
distinguish that case from the case at bar, because 
the Court therein states that 
''where an article of personal property 
is sold for a definite purpose made known 
to· the seller and the seller represents 
that the article will perform that partic-
ular purpose, there is a warranty of fit-
ness . ... " 
There is no evidence in the case at bar that the 
buyer even made known to the seller the particuJ,ar 
purpose for which the thermotainer was being 
bought. The defendant was buying a complete 
set-up of restaurant equipment. There is no evi-
dence that the seller in this case represented to 
the buyer that the article would perform any par-
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~.icular purpose. The Chicago Steel Foundry case 
i~ not in point. 
In the case of \Villiams v. Lowenthal, 12 Pac. 
(2d) 75, the buyer could neither read nor write, 
and gave definite evidence that he relied upon the 
representations n1ade by the seller as to what the 
machine would do, and as to its condition. An ex-
I:ress warranty was claimed in that case, as well 
as an implied warranty and the Court found tha,t 
.there was no express warranty, merely seller's 
talk, but that there was an implied warranty be-
cause of the fact that the buyer knew nothing about 
the machine, could not even read nor write, and 
relied implicitly upon the seller's representations. 
There is no evidence in the case at bar that can 
make that case applicable here. 
In the case of Sperry Flour Company v. De-
.l\tfoss, 18 Pac. (2d) 242, cited by appellant on page 
17 of his. brief, the Appellate Court approved the 
following instruction given by the lower court_: 
'' . . . If you find . . . the defendant in-
formed the plaintiff of the particular pur-
pose for which the defendant required the 
flour ... and if the defendant. relied on 
plaintiff's skill :or judgment, then I in-
struct. you there is an implied warranty.'' 
In the ease at bar, there was no evidence either 
with regard to any particular purpose being made 
known to the seller, nor with regard to any re-
liance by the buyer upon the plaintiff's skill or 
jl1dt:!nwnt, and there wasn't sufficient evidence to 
allow the case to go to the jury upon any question 
of implied warranty. 
In connection with the quotation by appellant 
on page 16 of its brief, from 55 Corpus Juris 757, 
we sugge~t that the Court read the original text 
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a little farther than counsel quoted it, because the 
language given is qualified by a statement whicH 
follows to the effect that it is necessary in such in-
stance for the buyer to show reliance not upon the 
trade mark, but upon the seller's skill and judg .. 
ment. 
There isn't one scintilla of evidence in thio 
case showing or tending to show that the defend-
ant made known to the plaintiff any particular pur-
pose for which it was buying this. equipment, nor 
is there one scintilla of evidence to the effect that 
the defendant relied upon the plaintiff's skilJ 
and judgment rather than the skill and judg-
ment which Mr. Glaus had obtained through 
~5 years in the restaurant business. l\f.r. Glaus, 
on behalf of the defendant co1npany, went to San 
Francisco to inspect this equipment for the very 
r(~ason that he was not willing to rely upon repre-
sentations or the skill and judginent of the plain-
tiff, and, having inspected the equipment and 
knowing that it was secondhand, went back to Los 
Angeles and signed a contract for the specific 
item of equipment which he had inspected and 
which was delivered to him. Clearly there can be 
no implied warranty under such circumstances. 
BREACII OF vVARRANTY 
In spite of defendant's claims with respect to 
warranties, either expressed or implied, the de. 
fendant failed to introduce or even offer sufficient 
evidence to go to the jury upon the question of 
whether there had been any breach of warranty, 
even were we to assume that a warranty had been 
g1.ven. The burden of the whole of defendant's 
testimony, both that offered by the officers of de-
fendant and the cooks and other employee's was 
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to the effect that this thermotainer ''dried out the 
food.'' The testimony shows that this thermotainer 
was so constructed that it had a dry heat com-
-partment, for the purpose of putting1 food in, sim-
ilar to what we used to call warming ovens.. This 
particular one had doors on it, both front and back 
(Tr. 364), and the testimony which is undisputed 
was to the effect that if these doors were kept 
properly closed the food would not dry out. (Tr. 
363-364). There was no evidence offered by the 
defendant as to any length of time that food was 
kept in this container, whether for minutes or for 
a whole day. There was no evidence as to the 
length of time it would take to dry the food out, and 
+here was no evidence produced by the defendant 
or any of its witnesses, or anyone else, to the effect 
that in the operation of this :particular thermo-
tainer, these doors were kept properly closed so 
as to retain the original moisture in the food. 
The defendant produced one expert w\itness, 
an employee of the Utah Power & Light Company, 
who had not only connected the equipment up 
originally, but who had worked on the thermotainer 
several times, and even with this witness, there was 
not one statement that could inform us in any way 
as to any defect in the machine itself. This expert 
stated that "some of the units were out at differ-
ent times'' (Tr. 203) and that he repaired those, 
as well as some of the iead wires and coiUlections, 
and that not at any· time when he checked the 
equipmer:t did he find anything of a mechanical 
nature wrong with this equipment, other than these 
t:.nits burning out or something similar to that, 
which he repaired or reconnected. ''No definite 
trouble as to why it didn't work" that he could 
put his finger on. (Tr. 203). 
Mr. (J lan~ hin1self stated that he could not 
tell how or in what manner it was defective. He 
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did not know what the defect was, and the mechanio 
didn't know what the defect was. (Tr. 228-231). 
There was no one who testified in any manner as 
to any actual defect in the machine itself. The 
whole testimony was that the food dried out, and 
the defendant did not even produce testimony to 
show the length of time food was l.eft in the 
machine or whether the doors were kept closed 
\Properly, or whether the machine was operated as 
it should have been; what temperatures were used 
in connection with it, or any other reason from 
which any court or jury could do anything except 
speculate. Even Mr. Glaus, with the knov.rledge of 
restaurant and cafeteria business, only made the 
contplaint that it was not adaptable to his purposes, 
and that it could no doubt be used to good advan-
tage in school cafeterias or comn1ercial cafeterias., 
(See Exhibits F and G), and that "that is what it 
was constructed for." (Tr. 2'30). There is no evi-
dence that the plaintiff, or any of its agents, haa 
rold Mr. Glaus that that was what it \vas construct-
ed for. l-Ie knew something of the equipment him-
self, and, knowing what he did, he bought it, al-
though he knew that it was primarily for cafeteria 
purposes, and even when he determined it was not 
adaptable for his purposes he still thought it could 
be used advantageously for school or commercial 
cafeterias. That "was what it was constructed 
for." (Tr. 230). 
Clearly, from such evidence, the Court would 
not be warranted in letting the question of any 
breach of a clain1ed warranty go to the jury for the 
Jury to speculate on when the defendant itself not 
only did not know, and could not tell, what the de-
fect was or if there was any defect, but affirmative-
ly testified that the equipment in its then condition 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
could be used for cafeterias, and that was what it 
was constructed for. 
There are other requisites necessary to de-
fendant's rase in which the record is wholly lacking. 
Upon the question of any breach of warranty, the 
defendant has the burden of proof, and when it is 
seeking damages by way of n~c.ou~rzear, it has 
the burden of showing either that the defective 
merchandise is of no value whatsoever or else evi-
dence must be adduced showing the actual value of 
the merchandise, and then a claim asserted for thf' 
difference between the actual value and the pur-
chase price by way of recoupment. The def~ndant 
did request the plaintiff to allow it a credit of 
$375.00 some time after the return of the thermo-
tainer. That would indicate that the defendant 
considered there was some value in the equipment, 
and yet there is no direct evidence that could g~ to 
the jury from which a jury could determine the 
actual amount of the damage suffered by appel-
lant as a result of the claimed breach of warranty. 
All that the jury could do in such a case would be 
speculate. In the pleadings it was claimed by de-
fendant in its defense of recoupment that it should 
be allowed by way of recoupment, the whole of the 
purchase price of $500.00, and yet there is not one 
scintilla of evidence showing or tending to show 
that the thermotainer was wholly valueless. On the 
contrary, what evidence there if; would tend to show 
that there was some value in the equipment, but 
that it conld not he used hy the defendant company. 
It was "not adaptable for its purpof;e." The de-
ff'ndant failed to snstain its burden of proof upon 
the question of breach of warranty. 
The contract under whicf1 this merchandise waf: 
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sold and delivered to defendant (Exhibit A) pro-
vides, paragraph 9-
'' . . . buyer agrees that claim will be 
made to the seller for all shortages, defi-
cienci~s, and errors of every kind within 
fifteen days from the date of scheduled 
opening, or 15 days from the date of instal-
lation, whichever is later.'' 
The Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provide: 
Section 81-3-9: " ... But if, after the ac-
ceptance of the! goods, ~the buyer fails to ~ve 
notice to the seller of the breach of any 
promise or warranty within a reasonable 
time after the buyer knows or ought to 
know, of such breach, the seller shall not 
he liable therefor.'' 
The thermota.iner was installed some time dur-
ing the latter part of October, 1934. No notice 
was given to the plaintiff company of any defect 
~n its operation within fifteen days from the time 
of the opening of the defendant cafe, or within 
fifteen days from the installation as required by 
the contract, and no notice of any kind was given 
to the plaintiff company until late in .May, 193fi. 
'I'he defendant does claim that it discussed the 
thermotainer with the salesman Don Nelson, some 
time around the middle of March, 19.35, and that it 
notified him at that time that the thermotainer 
was not working properly Thus, even giving the 
defendant the benefit of this testimony, at least 41h 
months elapsed from the time that the cafe opened 
and from the time the thermotainer was put in use 
before any complaint of any kind was f,riven, and a 
period of 1% months in addition elapsed before 
~omplaint was given direct to the plaintiff. 
With respect to equipment used in a cafe busi-
ness, where of necessitv there would be dailv con-
. "' 
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tact and daily use of a machine, a period of 41f2 
months is a much longer time than could or should 
be considered as a reasonable time within which 
.the buyer should give notice to the seller of any 
claimed breach of warranty, pursuant to the pro-
visions of the statute above quoted. 
NO V~.\LID SETTLEJ\1ENT AGREEMENT 
In addition to the claim of warranties and 
breach thereof, the defendant relied to a great ex-
tent upon a claimed settlement supposed to have 
been made "\\--ith plaintiff through one Don Nelson, 
and relies entirely on what defendant claims as ap-
parent authority in Don Nelson to make this settle-
ment agreement. Defendant claims that the said 
Don Nelson was an agent of the plaintiff, and states 
that "the agency is admitted," and goes to some 
extent in arguing on apparent authority and secret 
limitations upon an agent's authority. · 
At the outset, we must remind couns.el for the 
appellant that Don Nelson was not a general agent. 
He was merely a traveling sales representative for 
the plaintiff company, working out of the Portland 
office, and his authority was limited to soliciting 
orders for the company. Even the orders which he 
solicited had to be submitted to and accepted by the 
company before a binding contract was made. N eL 
Ron had no connection whatsoever with the original 
~ale of this merchandise, or with the sale of any bit 
of the merchandise involved in the large contract 
of goods bought by the defendant in October, 1934. 
Nelson was the sales representative covering this 
territory in 1935, and had been since 1929. The 
authority to ~olicit orders for sales to be accepted 
hy tlw plaintiff company at its home office did not 
givP Nelson .-my general agency, and gave him no Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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apparent authority to go beyond the usual things 
done by a sales representative. Appellant, in its 
brief, at page 7 states: 
"He sold restaurant equipment; also col-
lected money .and checks for plaintiff; also 
reported on complaints of customers, had 
attended to taking back merchandise in 
dealings with customers and returned de-
fective materials complained about ... " 
The appellant does not fairly state the record with 
such a statement. Nelson did sell restaurant equip-
ment. That was his duty with the company. He 
had collected money on occasion, but there was only 
one instance that the defendant, or any of its agents 
knew about, where he had even done so much as col-
leded monev or checks. Mr. Glaus testified as to 
~mne collections he thought Nelson bad made, but 
.~tated that Mrs. Glaus kept the books and would 
know more about that. Mrs. Glaus knew of only 
one instance where Mr. Nelson had collected money 
on any account, and in that instance Mrs. Glaus 
called ~fr. Nelson and asked him to come and get a 
payment, and she gave him a check payable to t~t 
company. There is only this one occasion that Mrs. 
Glaus could give any testimony on. (Tr, 280-281}. 
Upon the cross- examination of Mr, Nelson, 
counsel for the defendant asked him if he did not 
attend to taking back merchandise and the return of 
defective materials when customers complained 
about therr1. The answer of ~ir. Nelson was emphat-
ically in the negative. He had never adjusted any 
accounts. He had listened to customers' complaints 
and would send a report in to the home office 
with respect to them, but stated emrphatically that 
all adjustments had to be made with the home 
office, and not with him; that he had not at any 
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time taken back any defective merchandise and had 
done nothing with resiJect to any complaints, or 
the taking back of any claimed defective merchan-
dise, except by specific instructions from the lwme 
office to do so. No specific instance of any mer-
chandise ever having been returned through the 
mediation of :.Mr. Nelson was testified to, and he 
never attended to taking back any merchandise or 
equipment in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 374 to 376). 
l~ven this testimony was admitted over the objec-
tion of the plaintiff. Even had Nelson made ar-
rangements to take back merchandise on numerouR 
occasions it would have availed the defendant noth-
ing if the defendant had not known of Nelson's 
prior dealings in that regard. There is not one 
bit of testimony from the defendant compa.ny 
or any of its officers or agents to the effect that 
they kneu) of any course of prior dealtings wherein 
the representative Nelson, or any other salesman, 
or other agent of the plaintiff! company had made 
arrangements for taking back anu materials claimed 
to be defective. For this reason the defendant can 
not claim any apparent authority or any reliance 
upon apparent authority, because none had ap-
peared to them from any dealings of plaintiff with 
them prior to September, 1935, when the claimed 
settlement agreement was supposed to have been 
entered into. 
Appellant specifically refers to the fact that 
Nelson stated he would try to dispose of the ther-
nwtainer for Glaus and "that he had no instruc-
tions from the company (plaintiff) at that time." 
Nelson was doing that merely as a favor to .Glaus 
and was not acting as agent for the' plaintiff com-
J•an~' in doing so, nor did the defendant even at-
tempt to ~how that the plaintiff ever had any knowL 
edge of N eh;on 's stating to ~r r. Glaus that he would 
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try and dispose of the thermotainer for Mr. Glaus in 
his territory. 
A very important item which successfully neg-
atives any claim of the defendant to reliance upon 
apparent authority in Mr. Nelson, is the evidence 
which conclusively shows that Mr. Glaus, as presi-
dent and manager of the defendant concern, knew 
that the salesman, Nelson, did not have authority 
to contract with defendant or to make arrange-
ments with it for the return of this merchandise. 
He not only did not rely upon any appearance of 
authority, but he knew Nelson did not have the 
authority. The testimony of Mr. Glaus with re-
spect to it is -
''I told him something had to be done 
abo·ut the thermotainer, and he s.aid he 
would write his house to find out what 
thev could do. In about a day or two 
be~ told me he had had an answer . . . " 
(Tr. 163 and 189). 
Again, 
''and I told him something had to be done 
about the thermotainer, because we had it 
in the warehouse. We couldn't use it, and 
he said he would write his house to find 
out, and about two days later . . . he said 
he had an answer. (Tr. 165). 
"What did Mr. Nelson say as to what he 
received? 
"He said he had a telegram." (Tr. 167). 
;Mr. Nelson did write the plaintiff with respect to 
the complaints made by defendant concerning the 
thermotainer, but even this writing was done at the 
request of Mr. Glaus, because Glaus knew that Nel-
son did not have authority in himself to settle the 
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matter. Upon cross-examination, in response to 
the question ''and you asked him to write his 
house1'' Mr. Glaus answered "yes." (Tr. 225). 
This is confirmed by the letter (Exhibit F) 
written by ~Ir. Glaus to the plaintiff at Los Angeles, 
wherein Mr. Glaus states: 
":Jir. Don \Y. Nelson, of the Portland of-
fice, is here today and I have asked him 
to write you direct and which he is doing.':· 
Mr. Glaus, the president and manager of the 
defendant company, knew that Nelson was merely 
a traveling sales representative. He knew that he 
did not have the authority to enter into any bind-
ing contract for the return of any merchandise, or 
the adjustment of any account, and he specifically 
requested Nelson to take the matter up with the 
home office to see what could be done·. Glaus had 
notice of the limitations on the authority possessed 
by Nelson, and he admitted that Nelson told him 
that he had received a wire in response to the letter 
which he had written the Los Angeles office at the 
request of Glaus. This letter was specific author-
Ity to Nelson in excess of what he had as mere 
sales representative, and was not merely secret 
limitations on a general authority. It was a spe-
cific authority given in excess of authority known 
by Glaus to be repDsed in Nelson and Mr. Glaus, as 
agent of the defendant and, the defendant corpora-
tion ih~elf was bound by the limitations of that 
authorit:v as conferred in the telegram . 
. Another phase of this question arises. from the 
fact that there was no holding out of J\1r. Nelson as 
having authority to do any particular act in ques-
tion here, hy the plaintiff company. There never 
was any act of the plaintiff company, upon which 
the defcndm1t did or could have relied, by which 
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the plaintiff company held the agent Nelson out as 
possessing any authority whatsoever. Even the 
authority of Nelson as a sales agent was not men" 
tioned or commented on between the plaintiff and 
defendant until after the return of the thermo-
tainer. As far as the plaintiff might have been 
concerned, the salesman Nelson might never have 
written to the home office, but might merely have 
stated to Glaus that he would write to get authority 
and then a day or two later might have told Glaus 
that he did have authority. Mr. Glaus claims that 
he did not see the telegram. He relied on Nelson 
even for information to the effect that the plain-
tiff company had communicated with Nelson. A 
total stranger might have gone to Glaus and stated 
to him ''I will write to the Dohrman Company of 
Los Angeles, and see if they will take the thermo-
tainer hack.'' Then that s.tranger may have gone 
to Glaus in a day or two and stated "I have a tele-
gram,'' and then recited to Glaus the terms upon 
\Tth: e1 t he could return the thermotainer. Would 
the defendant contend that the plaintiff company 
would have held that stranger out as its agent whNl 
all the defendant had was the statements of 
this stranger to rely on. That i:.; exactly the situa-· 
tion in the case at bar. 
The claimed contracting for the return of this-. 
thermotainer was not within the implied powers or 
scope of the agency of Nelson, as a salesman. There 
was no holding out whatsoever by the company 
from which the defendant could assume any author-
Hy in excess of that granted to a sales.man. There 
was no course of prior dealings, either with the 
salesman Nelson or any other agent of tlle plain-
tiff company that would warrant the defendant in 
believing that the plaintiff cmnpany would recog-
nize the acts of such an agent. In fact, all there 
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was that was known 'to the defendant ;eompany 
was the fact that Nelson had at one time, on one 
occasion accepted one check payable to the plain-
tiff company upon an order of goods that he had 
actually sold to the defendant or to one or the 
other of the companies operated by Mr. and Mrs. 
Glaus. 
The authorities are uniform and without ex-
ception that under such circumstances a traveling 
salesman does not have any implied and there is 
no apparent authority upon which any third per-
son can rely and attempt to bind the supposed 
principal. 
A case directly in point upon this phase of, 
the subject is the case of 
Chamberlain v. Amalgamated Sugar Com-
pany, 247 Pac. 12 (Ida.) 
'fhe plaintiff Chamberlain claimed that the fore-
man of the defendant sugar company had entered 
into a contract on behalf of the defendant, author-
izing the plaintiff to haul lime rock, with the pro-
vision in the contract that there would be a min-
imum tonnage required, and that the plaintiff would 
be allowed to haul that minimum tonnage and be 
paid therefor. The defendant company did pay 
for rock actually hauled, but denied any obligation 
to pay for any minimum tonnage. The plaintiff 
sued for damages for breach of this contract, and 
the trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff on 
the basis of apparent or ostensible authority. In 
:reversing the judgment of the trial court 1 the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: 
''There i~ no evidence that theretofore con-
tracts of a like kind had been entered into 
by appellant's foren1an on its behalf, no 
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contract being entered into for any spe-· 
cified amount of rock or covering· a spe-
cified period of time, and there is no evi--
dence in the record that would justify the 
conclusion that contracts made by appel-
lant's foreman with third parties were up-
on any other basis than from day to day. 
It 'is apparent from the record that there 
was no conduct on the part of appellant 
from previous courses of dealing with re-
spondent or third parties that could be such 
that implied authority would flow to its 
foreman to enter into the contract in ques-
tion. It is the conduct of the pri.ncipal, 
and not the agent, that binds the principal. 
Madill v. Spokane Cattle Loan Co., 39 Ida-
ho 754; 230 P. 45; 2 C. J., Sec. 214, p. 57 4; 
Anderson v .. Patten,· 157 Iowa 23; 137 N. W. 
1050. 
''Even conceding the agreement between the 
respondent and appellant's foreman to be as 
stated in respondent's testimony, the ques-
tion arises whether or not there is sufficient 
competent proof to bind the appellant. The 
only evidence upon this point consisted of 
statements and declarations of appell,ant's 
foreman, and it is a well-known rule that 
the declarations of the agent, standing 
alone, are insufficient to prove the grant 
of power exercised by him and to bind his 
principal to third parties. . . . '' (Italics 
ours). 
In that case, the plaintiff had requested the 
foreman to give him a contract in writing. Even 
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tlmt '.Ya.s not necessarily a showing that the plain-
tiff had doubts as to the foren1an's authority. 
In the case at bar Glaus requested Nelson to 
write the Los Angeles office, thereby showing that 
he knew Kelson did not have the authority in the 
first place. Nelson told him he received some an-
swer, and Glaus, according to his own testimony, 
did not even request to see the instructions and 
authority g'iven :to Nelson ·in \the teleg1ram. Hj8 
was content to accept the declarations of Nelson 
without inquiring directly of the plaintiff com-
pany or without even asking to see the telegram. 
In the Idaho Sugar case, with respect to the 
lack of the written contract, the Court stated, (p. 
14): 
''Respondent was content to accept the 
declarations of the foreman after having 
requested a contract in writing in order to 
bind the company, . . , The rule would 
seem to be that a person dealing with am 
agent should ascertain the extent of his 
authority from the principal . . . If such 
person makes no inquiry: but chooses tc 
rely upon the aqent's statement. he is 
chargBable with knowledge of the agent's 
author,ity, and his ignorance of its extent 
will be no excuse to him, and the .fault 
cannot be thrown upon the principal who 
never authorized the act or contract. '' 
(Italics ours). 
Another Idaho case is the case of 
Tweedie Footwear Corporation v. Roberts-
Schofield Company, 285 Pac. 476. 
In that ca~~(' a salesman of the Tweedie Footwear 
Company secured two orders for shoes which were 
~igned hy the d0fendant company; the orders were 
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shoes were manufactured and delivered to the de-
fendant. It was contended by the de-fendant that 
the orders were given to the salesman with thet 
understanding that if any of the shoes could not 
be used, they might be returned. The defendant 
company attempted to take advantage of the agree_ 
ment, purportedly made by the salesman and re-
turned some of the shoes. The shoe company sued 
for the balance of the purchase price. The trial 
court gave judgment for the plaintiff for only part 
of' the full purchase price and on appeal the 
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial 
court with directions to enter judgment for the 
full amount. The Supreme Court held that a travel-
ing salesman for a manufacturer was held, as a 
1natter of law, to be without implied authority to 
give a purchaser an option of returning part of the 
merchandise after delivery, that the authority of 
th0 traveling salesman extended merely to the 
goliciting and transmitting of orders, and went no 
further. 
In the case of 
Burroughs Adding Machine Company v. 
Harris7 279 Pac. 216 (Cal.), 
a sales agent, after selling an adding machine, wa~ 
told by the buyer that the machine was unsatis-
factory, whereupon the salesman said ''send it 
back and I will cancel the contract." The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals held tbere was no author-
ity to return the machine. 
A rather early case on the subject is the case 
of 
Brigham v. Hibbard, 43 Pac. 383 (Ore.) 
One Wetmore was agent for the plaintiff in solicit-
ing an order for the salE' of goods to the defendant. 
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~he g~oods were shipped, and on receipt hy the de-
iendant) it was claimed that they were not as rep-
'resented. The defendant notified the salesman, 
"\Y etmore, and claimed that the salesman agreed 
with the defendant for the defendant to retain 
possession of the goods, and that he Wetmore, 
would take them and sell them on plaintiff's 
account. The trial court refused to admit evidence 
of this purported agTeement betwe.en the defendant 
and the agent Wetmore. On appeal, the rejection 
of this evidence was assigned as error, and in 
affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon stated, (p. 383) : 
''The assignment or error is not well 
taken, because it does not appear that 
Wetmore had authority to cancel the con-
tract between plaintiff and defendant, or 
substitute a new one, or to bind the plain--
tiff by any agreement in reference to the 
future disposition of the goods. He was 
traveling agent and solicitor of orders for 
his principal, but such authority did not 
give him power to rescind or change the 
contract after the receipt of. the goods by 
defendant. . . . it was not within the scope 
of Wetmore's agency to make a new con-
tract for the plaintiff in reference to such 
goods. Finding no error in the record, the 
judgment of the court below' must he 
affirmed.'' 
l\f r. Glaus knew Nelson did not have the 
authority he now claims to have relied on, as is 
shown by the fact that he requested Nelson to write 
for authority. A third party who knows or is 
advised that the agent does not have the power 
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which the agent purports to exercise, cannot rely 
upon any apparent authority. 
In the case of 
American National Bank v. Bartlett, 40 
Federal (2d) 21 (Okla.), 
a purported agent had told the bank cashier that 
,he (the agent) "would have to take it up with Mr. 
Mayer," his principal. The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Mc-
Dermott, held that this was sufficient to give the 
bank information that the agent did not have the 
authority they claimed to rely on, and that under 
such eircumst.ances, the bank was not juRtified in 
claiming reliance on any apparent authority. 
The particular authority which Nelson had in 
this instance was specific authority granted him 
by the telegram (Exhibit 1), and was not merely a 
secret limitation upon any general authority which 
he had. It was a specific written authority g1ranted 
to him for a specific purpose. The general rule 
in this connection is stated in 
2 Corpus Juris Secundun1, Sec. 92h, page 
1191: 
''·Where the authority under which an 
agent assumes to act in a particular case 
originates in a written instrument which 
sets forth its nature and extent, and the 
person dealing with him knows or is 
deemed by the law to know of the exist-
ence of such instrument, the latter is affected 
with knowledge of the contents of the in-:-
strument and is visited with all the con-
sequences of knowledge or notice of the 
scope of authority . . . '' 
''Furthermore, regardless of any question 
of legal requirement, where the power is 
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in fact created by a writing, and the third 
person is chargeable with notice of that 
fact he is under the duty of discovering 
the extent and limits of the agent's author~ 
ity and will be regarded as being aware of 
them; ... " 
It will be instructive here to note the basis of 
the doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority. 
2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 96c, page 
1211. 
''The doctrine of apparent authority rests 
upon principles of estoppel, or in the nature 
of an estoppel, forbidding one to deny to 
the prejudice of those~ he has misled. the 
consequences of an appearance of power 
which he produced.'' 
'' Ultimately it is but another appli-
cation of the fundamental maxim that any 
loss from misconduct of a third person 
should fall on that one of two innocehf per-
sons dealing through him who, by his con-
fidence, has made the loss possible.'' 
See also 
2 American Juris prudence, Section 104, 
page 88. 
In connection with ostensible or apparent 
authority, we must keep in mind that there are 
certain fundamental requirements" elements that 
must be present to raise an apparent or ostensible 
authority. There must either be a course of deal-
ing on behalf of theS41pposed agent for some tin1e 
prior to the time in question that has been known 
io and relied on by the third party claiming the 
apparent agency, and that has been approved or 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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direct action or representations made by the prin-
cipal to the third party in such a way that the 
principal himself is the one who has actually cre-
ated the appearance of authority. 
See 
2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 96d (3), 
page 1213. 
2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 96e, page 
1214. 
'' \Vhen an apparent authority is claimed 
to arise from representations or conduct, 
the acts and statements of the principal 
must be looked to for the requisite foun-
dation and not those of the ag:ent; the 
former alone can give rise to authority of 
this character; the latter are never in 
themselves sufficient for that purpose. 
,, 
'' . . . and no mere combination of circum-
stances which may, without the principal's 
participation, mislead third persons, how-
ever reasonably, into a false inference of 
authority affords a sufficient predicate 
for apparent authority.'' 
''"Where the principal's first knowledge 
that the agent is assuming to exercise 
powers of such character .as those under-
lying the third person's claim comes to 
h'im, and his first acquiescence occurs. 
subsequent to the transaction with the 
agent whereon such person relies., jt is in-
capable of supplying a basis for apparent 
authority, which can only be found in eon-
duct by the principal preceding the deal-
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,~ reliance. ' ' 
2 American Juris prudence, Sec. 103, p. 85. 
" . . . :l\Ioreover, the apparent authority 
for which the principal may be liable must 
be traceable to him, and cannot be es.tab-
lished solely by the acts and conduct of 
the agent; the principal is only liable for 
that appearance of authority caused by 
himself .... " 
See also 
2 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 100, page 
81. 
2 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 130, page 
105. 
In connection with the above authorities, we 
cite to the Court, the following case·s, in addition 
to those hereinbefore given. 
Graef v. Bowles, 248 Pac. 1090 (Ore.) 
Gates v. Flanagin, 31 S. W. (2d) 945 
(Ark.) 
Bagot v. Intermountain l\1illing Company, 
196 Pac. 824 (Ore.) 
Post v. City and County Bank, 183 Bac. 
802 (Ore.) 
Pac. States Corp. v. Gill, 206 Pac .. 489 
(Cal.) 
Jones v. l\farshall-Wellls Co., 208 Pac. 768. 
Commerce Furniture & U. Co. v. ·White 
Sewing Machine Co., 222 Pac. 516 
(Okla.) 
1IcMurray v. Pac. Heady Cut Home, 295 
Pac. 542 (Cal.) 
The appellant in its brief, contends that the 
telegram contained secret instructions which should 
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not be chargeable to the defendant. In this con-
nection we would only refer counsel to the general 
rule as. stated in 
2 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 105, p. 89, 
where we read : 
'' . . . Special or secret instructions or 
limitations upon the authority of an agent. 
whose powers would otherwise be co-
extensive with the business intrusted to 
him must be communicated to the party 
with whom he deals, or the principal will 
be bound to the same extent as though they 
were not given . . . '' (Italics ours). 
Counsel quotes on page 10 of appellant's brief 
from 2 Corpus Juris, Sec. 731, page 9~60. Couns.el 
left out a part of the quotation which we s:upply 
here: 
'' . . But whether or not there is any 
evidence tending to prove the existence of 
an agency is for the court to determine, 
and if there is none, or if it is so slight 
that a finding thereon of the existence of 
the agency would not be sustained, the 
question should be disposed of by the court 
alone, and should not be submitted to the 
jury; nor should the question be submitted 
to them where the facts relating· to the 
existence of the agency are undisputed 
and are such that only one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn therefrom ... " 
Also, counsel quotes from page 962, Section 
733, but we add the following which counsel negler.ted 
to add, after the portion quoted in counsel's brief: 
" . . . But whether there is any com-
petent evidence to establish the extent of 
the authority js a question of law for the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
~1 
court, and it has been held that such ques-
tion should be disposed of by the court 
alone and should not be submitted to the 
jury where there is no competent evidence, 
or where it is clear and undisputed, or 
n1anitc~tly insufficient to prove the author-
ity, or where the facts relating to the 
authority are undisputed and are such that 
reasonable minds could draw only one con-
clusion therefrom; . . . " 
In the case at bar there was absolutely no 
evidence of any holding out by the principal in 
this case. There was no prior course of dealing 
known to or relied upon by the defendant. There 
was no actual authority in the agent, Nelson, with 
merely secret limitations on it, but there was actual 
written authority more extensive than the limited 
authority already known to the defendant com-
pany. 
The witness. Nelson was a sales agent, and no more. 
There was no other authority conferred orally or 
otherwise, and none can be implied from the agent, 
Nelson's acts, nor the circumstances surrounding 
them, without connecting them up with thP prin-
cipal. 
On page 11 of appellant's brief, it is stated 
that "there is no dispute that Nelson was plain-
tiff's agent, and was authorized to contract for 
the return of the thermotainer.'' To the contrary, 
there is a dispute as to this authority. Nelson was 
merdy a ~alesman. Such a contract was not a part 
of, nor could it be implied from his general sales 
agencv. The onlv authoritv that Nelson would 
kwf· to enter int~ such a co~tract was by specific 
written in~trnction contained in the telegram, and 
of thi~ defendant had sufficient notice. It was a case 
of ~'pecifie authority upon a specific thing, wholly 
hr'·'·nnd and outside the reg-ular scope of the sales-
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man's Nelson's authority, and there was no act 
' ' . whatsoever of the principal upon whl.ch the de-
fendant did or could have relied in claiming1 to deal 
with Nelson. In such a case a third party deals 
with such an agent at his peril. 
SUMMARY 
1. 
The evidence conclusively shows in this case 
that there were no express warranties; that the 
statements claimed to have been made to defend-
ant were mere dealer's talk and were prior to and 
merged in the written contract, Exhibit A, in which 
no express warranty is contained. 
2. 
No warranty can be implied in the sale of thi~ 
t h ermotainer, 
(a) Because. there is not one bit of evi-
dence showing that defendant informed 
the plaintiff of the purpose for which the 
thennotainer was \vanted. 
(b) There is not one scintilla of evidence 
of any reHa;nce by the :buyer npo11 the 
<seller's skilJ and judgment.. On the con-
trary the defendant relied upon the knowl-
edge and skill of its president and man-
ager, Mr. Glaus, gained through over 25 
years of experience. 
(c) The thermotainer was bought after 
the defendant had made a speeial trip 
from Los Angeles, to San Francisco for the 
purpose of and after a full examination 
and inspectioln of the thermotainer, and 
the particular thermotainer inspected was 
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bought by the defendant and delivered by 
the plaintiff. 
(d) The thermotainer, known by defend-
ant to be a piece of secondhand equipment, 
was bought by defendant as such, after such 
knowledge and after complete inspection, 
and no warranties are implied in the sale 
of secondhand equipment. 
3. 
There is no evidence whatsoever - it is not 
a question of , sutfficient eviden~, but a lack of 
evidence altogether, "ith respect to what, if any, 
defect there was in this machine, or whether there 
was any breach of w'arranty. The testimony clear-
ly showed that Mr. Glaus, the manager of the de-
fendant company, while claiming the equipment to 
be defective, merely because it dried out the foods, 
still said that it would work all right in cafeteriaR, 
for which it was originally made. 
Clearly there is no sufficient evidence to allow 
a jury to do anything but speculate, as far as the 
record shows in this case. 
4. 
No settlement agreement binding upon the 
plaintiff was entered into, because, taking the evi-
dence most favorable to the defendant and dis-
regarding the denials made by the witness Nelson, 
with respect to the purported agreement, there was 
no apparent authority upon which the defendant 
did or could have relied in s.eeking to hold the 
plaintiff company for a contract purportedly made 
by N e I son in violation of specific written instruc-
tions. There was no previous course of dealin~ 
lwtween t1H• witness Nelson, and the defendant that 
l1ad been acquiesced in by the plaintiff. There wa~ 
not one :-:eintilla of evidence of the defendant's hav-
ing known of any prior occasion when Nelson, or 
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v.ny other similar salesm:n, arranged to take back ,j 
merchandise. There was no act of the plaintiff, as 
principal, acquiescing in any representation or 
statement 1nade by Nelson. 'fhere was no action 
of or representation made by the plaintiff direct 
to the defendant with reference to Nelson. In fact, 
on the contrary, there was specific knowledge on 
the part of Glaus, as president and manager of the 
defendant company, to the effect that Nelson did 
not have the authority to contract to take the ther-
motainer hack, and at Glaus' request Nelson wrote to 
get the attitude of the plaintiff company with re .. 
gard to the thermotainer. The defendant knew 
that whatever authority was given came by way of 
telegram, and would of necessity have to be in ex-
cess of the powers held by Nelson as a salesman. 
'fhe defendant was bound by the limitations con-
tained in that telegram, Exhibit 1, and there was no 
authority in the salesman Nelson to make any con-
tract whatsoever upon the basis of any apparent or 
ostensible authority other than merely the solicit-
ing of orders for the sale of merchandise, and the 
sending in of those orders for acceptance and ap-
proval of the home office. 
With respect to the items of costs, we would 
like to direct counsel's attention to Section 
104-44-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, with re-
spect to the premium on the cost bond and remind 
·counsel of the fact that the court reduced his. item· 
from $30.00 to $9.00. 
The court did not err in directing a verdict 
for the plaintiff, and the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Re·spectfully submitted, 
IRVINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Re., IJ\J .... ~---~· 
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